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INTRODUCTION
On December 30, 1998, the Court of Appeal in California found
that a trial court should have allowed a homeless man cited for
violating the City of Santa Ana’s anti-camping ordinance to assert the
1
necessity defense. In an earlier decision, the California Supreme

∗
Note and Comment Editor, American University Law Review; J.D. Candidate,
2001, American University, Washington College of Law; B.A., 1996, Barnard College. I
would like to thank Professor Susan Bennett and my editor, Adrianne R. Turner,
both of whom provided advice and comment throughout the preparation of this
Note.
1. In re Eichorn, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535, 540 (Ct. App. 1998) (permitting a
homeless man, arrested for sleeping in a public location, to raise the necessity
defense).
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The
Court found the anti-camping ordinance constitutional.
supreme court left open, however, the possibility for homeless
3
defendants to assert the “necessity defense,” as a justification for
4
violating the law. This defense provides a potentially valid reason for
5
breaking the law—out of necessity. In response to the creation of
this option, a number of legal scholars analyzed the application of
6
the necessity defense. Their analyses included the consideration of
many factors, including an individual defendant’s efforts to eliminate
his or her homeless condition, and lack of available resources
7
provided by the locality. In re Eichorn is the first case to apply the
necessity defense to the violation of an anti-camping ordinance by a
8
homeless person, and provides advocates and scholars with their first
glimpse into the role that this defense may play in homeless advocacy.
This Note asserts that the necessity defense demonstrates the

2. See Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1161-69 (Cal. 1995) (finding the
ordinance facially constitutional as it does not violate the right to travel or punish
status, and is not vague or overbroad).
3. See id. at 1155 (recognizing the possibility that defendants may raise “a dueprocess-based necessity defense”).
4. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
§ 5.4(a) (1986) [hereinafter SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW] (explaining that “one who,
under the pressure of circumstances, commits what would otherwise be a crime may
be justified by ‘necessity’ in doing as he did and so not be guilty of the crime in
question”).
5. See Eichorn, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 539 (explaining that the necessity defense
requires that the defendant be faced with a threatening situation such that no other
legal courses of action exist).
6. See Michael M. Burns, Fearing the Mirror: Responding to Beggars in a “Kinder and
Gentler” America, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 783, 809 (1992) (discussing the application
of five common law elements of the necessity defense to the crime of begging);
Robert C. McConkey III, “Camping Ordinances” and the Homeless: Constitutional and
Moral Issues Raised by Ordinances Prohibiting Sleeping in Public Areas, 26 CUMB. L. REV.
633, 658-59 (1995-1996) (discussing potential factors that courts could utilize in
determining the application of the necessity defense); Donald E. Baker, Comment,
“Anti-Homeless” Legislation: Unconstitutional Efforts to Punish the Homeless, 45 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 417, 452-53 (1991) (applying a hypothetical example of a homeless woman
arrested for sleeping on the street to the four traditional elements of the necessity
defense. But see David M. Smith, Note, A Theoretical and Legal Challenge to Homeless
Criminalization as Public Policy, 12 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 487, 508 (1994) (advocating
for the application of the defense of duress to anti-homeless ordinances over the
defense of necessity).
7. See McConkey, supra note 6, at 658 (suggesting that a defendant asserting the
defense of necessity needs to prove that he or she had nowhere else to sleep and that
the defendant may not rely solely on evidence that the number of available shelter
beds is insufficient compared to the homeless population).
8. See Burns, supra note 6, at 808-09 & n.139 (mentioning that Professor Alan
Levine, Hofstra University School of Law, sought to assert the defense of necessity
where police arrested a homeless man for trespassing in an abandoned apartment
building, but the prosecution withdrew the charges); see also Pottinger v. City of
Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1554 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (noting that members of the class of
plaintiffs could not raise the defenses of necessity or duress to contest an ordinance
that criminalized sleeping and eating in public places because authorities released
the arrested plaintiffs from custody without being charged).
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inutility of anti-camping and sleeping ordinances in removing
homeless people from public areas and in serving the broader social
goal of eliminating homelessness altogether. The recent application
of the necessity defense constitutes a shift toward focusing on
9
available alternatives and the strict balancing of harms analysis, and
10
away from the theory of voluntarism.
Courts thereby place the
burden on local governments to address the lack of resources
11
available to homeless people. This Note discusses potential policy
implications resulting from the application of the necessity defense,
including the potential for a large number of lawsuits. Both the farreaching policy implications and the numerous possible lawsuits
prove that in the interest of judicial efficiency, such ordinances
should be abolished.
Part I of this Note provides national statistics on homeless people,
and discusses causes of homelessness and the lack of affordable
housing and other services. In addition, this section focuses on
specific barriers to services and housing in cities implementing anticamping ordinances and how a homeless plaintiff may use these
barriers in asserting a necessity defense. Part II presents an overview
of the case law on anti-camping and sleeping ordinances. Part III
discusses the development of the necessity defense and its use today.
Part IV presents In re Eichorn and discusses the court’s analysis of the
application of the necessity defense where police cited a homeless
man for violating an anti-camping and sleeping ordinance.
I.

HOMELESSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES
12

In an effort to address the presence of homeless people living on

9. Balancing of harms, or comparing harms, is exemplified by the Model Penal
Code § 3.02(1)(a), which states that “the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such
conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense
charged.” Model Penal Code § 3.02(1)(a) (1962); see also John T. Parry, The Virtue of
Necessity: Reshaping Culpability and the Rule of Law, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 397, 417-19
(1999) (discussing the balance-of-harms approach in the context of justification).
10. “The theory of voluntarism holds that defendants are morally culpable and
may be punished if they had the capacity and opportunity to conform to the law—
that is, at a minimum, if they could have acted differently had they chosen to do so.”
Parry, supra note 9, at 421.
11. See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places:
Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 560-61 (1997)
(arguing that “police cannot perform substantial order maintenance tasks without
legal authority” and in order to address the inappropriate emphasis on improved
“quality of life” through police enforcement, “there is a need for renewed focus upon
those political, administrative, and other ‘subconstitutional’ controls that might assist
in constraining arbitrary police enforcement”).
12. The Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act defines a homeless person
as:
(1) an individual who lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime
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13

the street, many jurisdictions have enacted laws that ban activities
primarily attributed to homeless people, such as sleeping and
14
camping in public. Such laws affect a small portion of the 700,000
15
For instance,
people who are homeless on any given night.
conservative estimates indicate that in Washington, D.C., there are
16
7,500 homeless people, but only between 700 and 1,800 live on the

residence; and
(2) an individual who has a primary nighttime residence that is—
(A) a supervised publicly or privately operated shelter designed to provide
temporary living accommodations (including welfare hotels, congregate
shelters, and transitional housing for the mentally ill);
(B) an institution that provides a temporary residence for individuals
intended to be institutionalized; or
(C) a public or private place not designed for, or ordinarily used as, a
regular sleeping accommodation for human beings.
42 U.S.C. § 11302 (1994). The Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act is the
only major federal legislation addressing homelessness. See id. § 11301 (designating
that the purpose of the Act is to address, on a federal level, the “immediate and
unprecedented crises” of homelessness in our nation).
In addition to the McKinney Act definition of a homeless person, localities such as
Washington, D.C., also consider a family or individual who has lived for any period of
time with another person who is the owner or controller of the residence to be
homeless. Such a condition is called “doubling up.” See MARTHA BURT, OVER THE
EDGE 8 (1992) (noting that doubling up may occur when households want to share
costs when housing becomes unaffordable); see also Maria Foscarinis, Downward
Spiral: Homelessness and its Criminalization, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 7 (1996) (“Many
homeless individuals and families double up with relatives or friends before reaching
the streets or shelters . . . .”).
13. See Rob Teir, Restoring Order in Urban Public Spaces, 2 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 255,
256 (1998) (discussing the “national trend to re-establish a semblance of order,
comfort, and security in urban public spaces”); see also Elisabeth Bumiller, In Wake of
Attack, Guiliani Cracks Down on Homeless, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1999, at A1 (reporting
on Mayor Rudolph Guiliani’s decision that police will arrest homeless people if
found on the street after a homeless man attacked a woman).
14. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 647(j) (West 1999) (mandating that “[e]very
person who commits any of the following acts is guilty of disorderly conduct, a
misdemeanor: . . . (j) Who lodges in any building, structure, vehicle, or place,
whether public or private, without the permission of the owner or person entitled to
the possession or in control of it”).
15. See James D. Wright & Joel A. Devine, Housing Dynamics of the Homeless:
Implications for a Count, 65 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 320, 323, 328-29 (1995) (analyzing
the U.S. Bureau of Census’ S-Night count of homeless people, which totaled 228,372
people, and concluding that it is more likely that there are between 734,000 and
1,300,000 homeless people in the United States on a given night); see also Martha R.
Burt, Critical Factors in Counting the Homeless: An Invited Commentary, 65 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 334, 335 (1995) (supporting Wright and Devine’s point-in-time
figure of 700,000 homeless people and suggesting that the 1,300,000 figure falls short
of the likely 2-3 million people who are homeless annually).
16. See THE COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIP FOR THE PREVENTION OF HOMELESSNESS, 19971998 REPORT TO THE COMMUNITY 9 & n.9 (1999) [hereinafter COMMUNITY
PARTNERSHIP] (noting, however, that other estimates show that there are over 10,000
persons permanently housed with District and Federal “homeless” dollars each day).
A recent article notes the increase of homelessness in the District of Columbia as
reported by homeless service providers critical of the Community Partnership’s
conclusion that homelessness had declined since 1996. See Serge F. Kovaleski &
Sewell Chan, Indicators Show D.C. Homelessness Getting Worse, WASH. POST, Feb. 14,
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17

street.
National and local statistics on homelessness and resources
available to homeless people provide a background to the impact
anti-sleeping and camping ordinances have on homeless people. The
lack of shelter, affordable housing, and income resources in U.S.
cities indicate that homeless people often have no place to go and
have little opportunity to find housing in the near future. For
homeless persons sleeping on the street, the lack of opportunity to
find and maintain housing inevitably translates into continued
violations of city anti-camping and sleeping ordinances.
Violations of these ordinances affect a wide cross section of
individuals because the national homeless population is diverse. In
1999, the U.S. Conference of Mayors published A Status Report on
Hunger and Homelessness in America’s Cities: 2000, that analyzed surveys
18
on hunger and homelessness in twenty-five U.S. cities. Of the cities
surveyed, the report found that 36% of the homeless population were
19
families with children; 22% were mentally ill; 37% were substance
20
abusers; 26% were employed; and 15% were veterans.
The causes of homelessness are equally diverse. Martha Burt, in
her book Over the Edge, argues that the two direct causes of
21
homelessness are housing and income. The housing factor includes
two variables—rental vacancy rate and the ratio of low-income renters

2001, at A1. But see Mary Otto, Area Counts 12,850 Homeless in a Day, WASH. POST, Apr.
12, 2001 at A1 (reporting that a recent study from the Metropolitan Washington
Council of Governments found that 7,058 homeless people live in Washington, D.C.
and 5,792 homeless people live in the surrounding suburbs in Maryland and
Virginia).
17. See id. at 7 (discussing a National Institute for Drug Abuse study conducted in
1992, which found 1,800 homeless people living on the streets and the Community
Partnership’s study, which found 700 people who remain on the streets for a period
of at least 90 days, which the organization considers only an “informed estimate”).
18. THE U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, A STATUS REPORT ON HUNGER AND
HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA’S CITIES i (2000) [hereinafter U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS]
(assessing the status of hunger and homelessness in American cities by surveying 26
major cities where the mayors were members of the Task Force on Hunger &
Homelessness).
19. Id. at ii; see also HOMES FOR THE HOMELESS, 1994-95 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1995)
(asserting that there are 600,000 homeless families each year).
20. See U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 18, at ii (providing statistics
concerning the demographics of America’s homeless population).
21. See BURT, supra note 12, at 162 (determining that a city’s homelessness rate is
most directly affected by housing and income variables); see also U.S. CONFERENCE OF
MAYORS, supra note 18, at ii, 67 (finding that survey cities report that the lack of
affordable housing is the most significant factor that causes homelessness). The U.S.
Conference of Mayors notes that other causes of homelessness include “low paying
jobs;” “substance abuse and the lack of needed services;” “mental illness and the lack
of needed services;” “domestic violence;” “poverty;” “changes in cuts in public
assistance programs;” and “the lack of access to affordable healthcare.” Id. at 67.
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The second factor, income, includes the
to affordable units.
23
particular geographic area’s poverty rate and per capita income.
Burt also presents indirect factors, such as benefits affecting
homelessness via income, the number of persons in a household who
24
can work, the locality’s unemployment rate, and the cost of living.
A. Housing, Income, and Shelter Statistics
The shortage of affordable housing is a significant barrier to
25
housing for a homeless person or family.
In March 1999, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development reported that,
although there is “record growth in the economy,” rental housing is
26
too expensive for low-income persons and there is a “dramatic loss”
27
of affordable housing. Those persons who do not receive housing

22. See BURT, supra note 12, at 162 (noting that a low vacancy rate results in more
homelessness as does a high ratio of low-income renters).
23. See id. at 162, 164. The Census Bureau determines the poverty rate based
upon “a set of money income thresholds that range by family size and composition to
detect who is poor.” See U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey (CPS)—
Definitions and Explanations (visited Sept. 14, 2000), at http://www.census.gov/
population/www/cps/cpsdef.html.
24. See BURT, supra note 12, at 164-65. Burt shows that all indirect resources also
affect homelessness directly. See id. at 164.
25. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN
DEV., PRACTICAL LESSONS: THE 1998 NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON HOMELESSNESS
RESEARCH vii (1999) (“Receipt of affordable housing is the single greatest predictor
of formerly homeless persons’ ability to remain in housing.”).
26. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., WAITING IN VAIN: AN UPDATE ON
AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING CRISIS 14 (1999) [hereinafter WAITING IN VAIN]
(determining that, based on the Consumer Price Index for Residential Rent, rents
rose at a rate almost double that of inflation between 1996 and 1998). HUD also
finds that based upon Bureau of Labor Statistics figures between 1995-1997 “rents
slightly outpaced income . . . for the 20% of U.S. households with the lowest
incomes.” Id. at 15; see also NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, OUT OF
SIGHT—OUT OF MIND ii (1998) [hereinafter OUT OF SIGHT] (finding that a survey of
50 U.S. cities revealed that between 17 and 37% of individuals “are unable to afford
the fair market rent for an efficiency apartment in their metropolitan area”).
27. See WAITING IN VAIN, supra note 26, at 15 (finding that the number of housing
units that rent for less than $300 decreased by 13% between 1996 and 1998). HUD
indicates that lack of access to housing for low-income persons is precipitated also by
the lack of housing assistance provided by HUD as a result of a withdrawal of
Government support. See id. at 16. A further hurdle to the provision of affordable
housing is the failure of owners of project-based Section 8 housing to renew their
contracts with HUD, where there is little financial incentive to do so because HUD
cannot offer competitive market rents. See id. at 16-17.
The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities found that the number of low-income
renters exceeded the number of low-income housing units by 4.4 million. See Center
on Budget and Policy Priorities, Press Release, In Search of Shelter: The Growing Shortage of
Affordable Rental Housing (visited Nov. 7, 1999), at http://www.cbpp.org/615houspr.htm. Although low-income households should pay only 30% of their income on
housing, 82% of these families used more than 30% of their income for housing. See
id. Where low-income people are required to maintain housing with more than onethird of their income, finding and retaining affordable housing while homeless is a
significant challenge. See id.
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assistance promptly due to this shortage are placed on waiting lists
that may result in a wait anywhere between a few months to several
28
years for housing. Some of the longest wait times are in large urban
areas, such as New York where the wait time for public and Section 8
29
30
Other cities have refused to accept
housing is eight years.
applications for at least one affordable housing program because of
31
the length of the existing wait lists.
Earnings from employment may assist homeless people in
obtaining basic necessities and, in some cases, housing, but
homelessness is not solved through work alone. The National Law
Center on Homelessness & Poverty explains that a person working
forty hours per week at minimum wage still cannot afford fair market
32
33
rent for an efficiency apartment in any of the fifty cities analyzed.
Some homeless people work as day laborers or hold part-time or even
34
35
full-time jobs. As many as 44% of homeless people work, but often

28. See WAITING IN VAIN, supra note 26, at 7-8 (finding that in 1998 the average
waiting time nationwide for public housing was eleven months and for Section 8
housing was twenty-eight months).
29. HUD provides two types of Section 8 housing. The first, and most common
form, is the Section 8 rental voucher program, where voucher recipients may lease
privately owned housing and pay approximately 30% of their income for that
housing. HUD then provides the difference between the tenant’s share of rent and
the total rent charged by the landlord. See U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Section
8 Program Fact Sheet (visited Sept. 17, 2000), at http://www.hud.gov/section8.html.
The second type of Section 8 housing, project-based Section 8, provides a subsidy to
owners of buildings who reserve units for Section 8 holders. Forty percent of all units
designated for recipients of Section 8 assistance are reserved for families at or below
30% of the local area median income. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., RENTAL
HOUSING ASSISTANCE—THE WORSENING CRISIS 9 (2000) [hereinafter THE WORSENING
CRISIS].
30. See WAITING IN VAIN, supra note 26, at 8 (finding that, in addition to the
lengthy wait in New York, wait times for public housing in other cities include “6
years in Oakland, and up to 5 years in Washington, D.C. and Cleveland,” and that
Section 8 housing waiting times are 5 years in Memphis, up to 5 years in Chicago, 7
years in Houston, up to “10 years in Newark, and 10 years in Los Angeles”); see also
COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIP, supra note 16, at 7-8 (finding that 267 homeless families
remain on the wait list for family emergency shelter in the District of Columbia).
31. See U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 18, at 88 (noting that 44% of
survey cities stopped accepting applications for assisted housing programs).
32. HUD determines the fair market rent (FMR) of housing by “estimat[ing] . . .
rent plus the cost of utilities, except telephone. [FMRs] are housing market wide
estimates of rents that provide opportunities to rent standard quality housing
throughout the geographic area in which rental housing units are in
competition . . . . FMRs are set at the 40th percentile rent—the dollar amount below
which 40% of standard quality rental housing units rent.” 24 C.F.R. § 888.113 (2000).
33. See OUT OF SIGHT, supra note 26, at i. The National Law Center also suggests
that a person subsisting on Supplemental Security Income (a benefit for blind,
elderly, or people with disabilities) will not be able to afford housing at the fair
market rent in any of the cities surveyed. See id. at 2.
34. See NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, DUE CREDIT 3 (1998)
[hereinafter DUE CREDIT] (discussing six studies that show that homeless people
work in both full-time and part-time jobs).
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36

they only earn enough funds to last one day. As a result, homeless
37
people have little to no surplus income to set aside as savings.
Consequently, they cannot secure housing.
In addition, the unemployment rate has increased in many cities.
38
In contrast to the national decreased rate of joblessness, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development found that one in
39
six “central cities” has an unemployment rate at 50% above the
40
national average. The report also found that one in twelve cities has
an unemployment rate that is 75% or more above the national
average and one in fifteen cities has an unemployment rate that is
41
100% above the national average.

35. See THE URBAN INSTITUTE ET AL., THE FORGOTTEN AMERICANS—HOMELESSNESS:
PROGRAMS AND THE PEOPLE THEY SERVE 29 (1999) (prepared for Interagency Council
on the Homeless) (finding that based on a survey of 76 metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas, 44% of the homeless persons interviewed conducted paid work
during the 30 day period before being interviewed). But see U.S. CONFERENCE OF
MAYORS, supra note 18, at ii (finding that in a survey of 25 cities, 26% of homeless
people are employed).
36. See DUE CREDIT, supra note 34, at 2 (discussing that homeless people cannot
accumulate savings because they often must resort to day labor, panhandling, selling
junk, and other forms of activity that provide inconsistent income in order to survive
each day). Some homeless individuals and families may qualify for the federal
Earned Income Tax Credit, which would enable them to use their tax refund to pay
for housing, transportation, clothing, or medical needs. See id. at 6 (discussing the
use of the Earned Income Tax Credit by homeless people).
37. See id. (explaining that homeless people are rarely able to save enough funds
to pay for housing).
38. See Mary Williams Walsh, Unemployment Falls to 4.1%, Best in 30 Years, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 6, 1999, at A1 (discussing the recent decline in the unemployment rate
to 4.1%, the lowest level since January 1970).
39. A central city is defined as:
A. The city with the largest population in the [Metropolitan Statistical
Area];
B. Each additional city with a population of at least 250,000 or with at least
100,000 persons working within its limits;
C.
Each additional city with a population of at least 25,000, an
employment/residence ratio of at least .75, and at least 40 percent of its
employed residents working in the city;
D. Each city of 15,000 to 24,999 population that is at least one-third as large
as the largest central city, has an employment/residence ratio of at least .75,
and has at least 40 percent of its employed residents working in the city;
E. The largest city in a secondary noncontiguous urbanized area, provided it
has at least 15,000 population, an employment/residence ratio of at least .75,
and has at least 40 percent of its employed residence working in the city;
F. Each additional city in a secondary noncontiguous urbanized area that is
at least one-third as large as the largest central city of that urbanized area,
that has at least 15,000 population and an employment/residence ratio of at
least .75, and that has at least 40 percent of its employed residents working in
the city.
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., NOW IS THE TIME: PLACES LEFT BEHIND IN THE
NEW ECONOMY 41 (1999).
40. See id. at 2.
41. See id.
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Moreover, the number of shelter spaces woefully fails to meet
demand. The U.S. Conference of Mayors found that although the
42
number of shelter spaces for homeless people increased by 15%, the
unmet need is great. The study found that 23% of shelter requests by
43
homeless people went unmet during the last year even though
44
shelter requests increased by 15%. The Law Center reports that
none of the 50 cities surveyed have enough shelter spaces for the
45
In
number of homeless people in that city on any given day.
Washington, D.C., for example, a family must often wait over six
46
months for shelter.
Therefore, in a great number of cities in the United States,
homeless people often do not have any other choice but to live on
47
the street. Until the needs of homeless people are met through
social services, arresting and citing homeless people will not relieve
homelessness and certainly will not reduce the presence of homeless
people in public places. If judicial responses to these ordinances
identify these deficiencies, localities may consider alternative means
to eliminating homelessness.
II. EIGHTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO ORDINANCES BANNING
SLEEPING IN PUBLIC
In an effort to remove homeless people from desirable locations,

48


42. See U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 18, at 51 (noting that 52% of the
cities surveyed had an increase in shelter beds). Family shelter beds increased by
26%. See id.
43. See id. at 61 (identifying that 27% of requests by homeless families also went
unmet).
44. See id. at ii.
45. See OUT OF SIGHT, supra note 26, at 1-2; see also Nina Bernstein, Shelter
Population Reaches Highest Level Since 1980’s, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2001, at A27
(reporting that an increase in homeless people applying for shelter in New York City
pushed the number of people in the shelter to system to its highest point since the
late 1980s with the system overflowing with about 500 families per night); U.S.
CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 18, at 62, 64 (noting that 68% of survey cities
“may have to turn away homeless families” and 56% of cities “may have to turn away
homeless people other than families because of a lack of resources”).
46. See COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIP, supra note 16, at 6-7 (discussing barriers to
providing assistance to homeless people and noting that 267 homeless families
remain on a wait list for shelter).
47. This assertion is not made with the intent to address statements, made by
proponents of anti-camping and sleeping ordinances, suggesting that homeless
advocates want to establish a right to live on the street. See Teir, supra note 13, at 257
(“[M]any ‘homeless advocates’ and civil libertarians have championed the ‘right’ to
live on the street, sleep in the public place of one’s choosing, beg in any place and in
any manner one pleases, and to essentially be exempt from standards of conduct that
apply to others.”).
48. The motivation behind ordinances that ban camping, sleeping, begging and
other activities in public locations ranges from creating more aesthetic urban areas
to preventing crime. See Teir, supra note 13, at 291 (suggesting that ordinances
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many city governments have enacted ordinances banning activities
49
that constitute basic daily activities for homeless people. Advocates
for homeless people have brought constitutional claims against local
50
51
52
governments under the right to travel, vagueness, the Equal

which combat “street-level disorder,” including panhandling and sleeping in public,
are aimed at reducing crime and making public places more desirable for the
general population); see also E. J. Dionne, Jr., A Broken-Windows Approach to Crime,
WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 1996, at C7 (discussing Kelling and Coles’ “Broken Windows”
approach to “aggressive panhandling, and preventing public parks from being taken
over by homeless people”). The “broken windows” approach to urban renewal
derives its name from the following analogy:
If a factory or office window is broken, passersby observing it will conclude
that no one cares or no one is in charge. In time, a few will begin throwing
rocks to break more windows. Soon all the windows will be broken, and now
passersby will think that, not only is no one in charge of the building, no one
is in charge of the street on which it faces. Only the young, the criminal, or
the foolhardy have any business on an unprotected avenue, and so more and
more citizens will abandon the street to those they assume prowl it. Small
disorders lead to larger and larger ones, and perhaps even to crime.
James Q. Wilson, Foreword to GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING
BROKEN WINDOWS xv (1996). Nevertheless, attempts to create order in urban areas
by attacking homeless people through the use of anti-camping, sleeping and begging
ordinances are misplaced. See Maria Foscarinis, Wrong Approach to Homelessness, WASH.
POST, Jan. 13, 1997, at A16 (stating that the “broken windows” approach obscures the
issue of homelessness). As Foscarinis asserts in her response to an editorial
supporting the application of the “broken windows” theory on homeless people’s
presence in public places, “[p]eople must be somewhere, and as long as they have no
private space, they will be in public. At most, criminalizing their use of public space
will move them temporarily into jails and prisons—only to be released back onto the
streets.” Id. Therefore, the only approach to addressing the presence of homeless
people in public places is to provide such basic services as shelter, housing, and
income assistance that will prevent people from being forced to live on the streets.
See id. (suggesting that a more effective way than the “broken windows” approach is
for communities to guarantee that all its members have a place to go).
49. See OUT OF SIGHT, supra note 26, at ii (finding that between 1996 and 1998,
12% of the 49 cities surveyed enacted ordinances banning begging and 18% of the
cities enacted ordinances prohibiting certain conduct in public places, including
begging). As of December 1998, 86% of the cities participating in the Law Center
survey banned begging and 73% banned certain behaviors in public places. See id. at
i-ii. The survey cities included Denver, CO; Fort Worth, TX; Oklahoma, OK;
Portland, OR; Long Beach, CA; Kansas City, MO; Virginia Beach, VA; Charlotte, NC;
Tucson, AZ; Albuquerque, NM; Atlanta, GA; St. Louis, MO; Sacramento, CA; Fresno,
CA; Tulsa, OK; Oakland, CA; Honolulu, HI; Miami, FL; Pittsburgh, PA; Cincinnati,
OH; Minneapolis, MN; Omaha, NE; Toledo, OH; Buffalo, NY; New York, NY; Los
Angeles, CA; Chicago, IL; Houston, TX; Philadelphia, PA; San Diego, CA; Dallas, TX;
Phoenix, AZ; Detroit, MI; San Antonio, TX; San Jose; CA; Indianapolis, IN; San
Francisco, CA; Baltimore, MD; Jacksonville, FL; Columbus, OH; Milwaukee, WI;
Memphis, TN; Washington, DC; Boston, MA; El Paso, TX; Seattle, WA; Cleveland,
OH; Nashville, TN; Austin, TX; and New Orleans, LA. See id. at 3-4.
50. See generally Maria Foscarinis & Richard Herz, The Criminalization of
Homelessness: An Overview of Litigation Theories and Strategies, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
719, 719-24 (1996) (providing a guide to challenges of anti-homeless ordinances);
Foscarinis, supra note 12, at 36-38 (discussing constitutional challenges to local
ordinances and policies that criminalize homelessness and public policy implications
for such laws and policies).
51. See Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1580-81 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (finding
that arresting homeless people violates the fundamental right to travel); see also
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54

Although these legal
Protection Clause, and overbreadthness.
theories proved somewhat successful in challenging anti-camping
ordinances, the most successful argument relies on the Eighth
55
56
Amendment prohibition against punishment for status.
The notion of a status crime originated in the Supreme Court case
57
of Robinson v. California where the Court examined a California
58
statute that made it a crime to “be addicted to the use of narcotics.”
The Court found that where a statute could make “the ‘status’
narcotic addiction a criminal offense, for which the offender may be
59
prosecuted ‘at any time before he reforms,’” such a statute is “an
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
60
and Fourteenth Amendments.”
Six years later, the Supreme Court considered the application of
61
Robinson to Powell v. Texas, where the petitioner was convicted of

Davidson v. Tucson, 924 F. Supp. 989, 993 (D. Ariz. 1996) (discussing the plaintiffs’
claim that the anti-camping ordinance violated their right to travel, a fundamental
constitutional right).
52. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (invalidating
a vagrancy ordinance on the basis of vagueness because the rule fails to give notice
and encourages arbitrary convictions and arrests); see also Tobe v. City of Santa Ana,
892 P.2d 1145, 1167 (Cal. 1995) (finding that the lower court erred in finding that
an ordinance was unconstitutionally vague); cf. Nina Bernstein, A Homeless Man
Challenges New York City Crackdowns, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1999, at A1 (discussing
Betancourt v. Guiliani, a federal class-action lawsuit brought by a homeless man
against Mayor Rudolph Guiliani for arresting him and twenty-five other homeless
people under an ordinance they argue is impermissibly vague); David Rohde, Judge
Upholds Policy on Arresting the Homeless Who Sleep in Boxes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2000, at
B1 (stating that the court dismissed all of Augustine Betancourt’s claims except a
claim that he had been improperly searched).
53. See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1577-78 (responding to, but not deciding, the
assertion raised by homeless plaintiffs that homelessness is a suspect class and
therefore an ordinance would be subject to strict scrutiny).
54. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
494 (1982) (determining that a challenge to a statute based on overbreadthness is
limited to those statutes that covered “a substantial amount of constitutionally
protected conduct”); see also Tobe, 892 P.2d at 1168-69 (determining that a lower
court’s determination that an “ordinance was broader than necessary since it banned
camping on all public property” was incorrect because the ban would be
unconstitutional only if it violated equal protection or impinged a fundamental
right).
55. The Eighth Amendment states that “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
56. See Juliette Smith, Comment, Arresting the Homeless for Sleeping in Public: A
Paradigm for Expanding the Robinson Doctrine, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 293, 319-20
(1996) (noting that courts have upheld the proposition that anti-sleeping ordinances
unconstitutionally criminalize status).
57. 370 U.S. 661 (1962).
58. See id. at 661.
59. Id. at 666.
60. Id.
61. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
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62

Petitioner claimed that his conviction
public drunkenness.
constituted a violation of the Eighth Amendment as cruel and
63
unusual punishment. The Court distinguished Powell’s claim from
the holding in Robinson by finding that Powell was arrested and
64
convicted for being drunk in public and not for being an alcoholic.
Thus, the Court found that the Texas public drunkenness statute was
65
constitutional, as it did not punish status, but acts and behaviors that
require “the moral accountability of an individual for his antisocial
66
deeds.”
In 1992, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida decided the seminal case in the field of homeless rights—
67
Pottinger v. City of Miami. The court found that the City of Miami’s
practice of arresting homeless persons for engaging in basic activities
of daily life—including sleeping and eating—constituted cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment as punishment
68
for status. The court distinguished the life situations of homeless
class members from the petitioner in Powell, suggesting that
69
homelessness rarely, if ever, is a choice.
In addition, the court
found that the Powell plurality did not consider homeless people in its
70
analysis, specifically those people who cannot find shelter. Justice
White, however, addressed this issue in his concurrence in Powell:
Although many chronics have homes, many others do not. For all
practical purposes the public streets may be home for these
unfortunates, not because their disease compels them to be there,
but because, drunk or sober, they have no place else to go and no place
else to be when they are drinking. This is more a function of economic
station than of disease, although the disease may lead to destitution

62. See Powell, 392 U.S. at 517 (stating that the appellant Powell was arrested and
charged for being intoxicated).
63. See id. at 532 (asserting that his condition of chronic alcoholism paralleled
that of the drug-addicted defendant in Robinson, where a California state law was
deemed unconstitutional because it made the “status” of being a drug addict a crime,
rather than the actual possession or use of an illegal drug).
64. See id.
65. See id. (stating that Texas has not sought to punish a status, but rather has
imposed a criminal sanction for certain types of public behavior).
66. Id. at 535-36 (noting that the court is unwilling to ignore common law
tradition of imposing criminal punishments for acts deemed to be antisocial or
immoral).
67. 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
68. See id. at 1565 (holding that the ordinances cannot be used to punish the
homeless plaintiffs for sleeping, eating, and other innocent conduct).
69. See id. at 1563 (“Rather, homelessness is due to various economic, physical or
psychological factors that are beyond the homeless individual’s control.”).
70. See id. (stating that the plurality in Powell did not have to factor homeless
people into its analysis).
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71

Despite the court’s findings in Pottinger, other courts have declined
72
to extend the Robinson protection to similar ordinances. Tobe v. City
of Santa Ana is one of the most recent decisions rejecting Eighth
Amendment protection to homeless people arrested under such
73
ordinances.
74
The ordinance at issue in Tobe barred camping and storing
75
personal belongings in public places. Plaintiffs launched a multiprong attack on the ordinance, arguing that it: was unconstitutional
as an impermissible restriction on the right to travel; punished

71. Powell, 392 U.S. at 551 (emphasis added).
72. See Joyce v. San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 857 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (finding
that the “Matrix” program of enforcing anti-homeless ordinances did not violate the
Eighth Amendment, as homelessness is not a status); cf. Johnson v. Dallas, 61 F.3d
442, 443-44 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to appeal an
anti-sleeping ordinance because they had not been arrested under the statute);
Davison v. Tucson, 924 F. Supp. 989, 992 (D. Ariz. 1996) (denying a preliminary
injunction to homeless plaintiffs because they did not meet their burden of proving
probable success on the merits of their Eighth Amendment and Equal Protection
claims).
73. 892 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Cal. 1995) (finding that the ordinance “does not
impermissibly restrict the right to travel, does not permit punishment for status, and
is not constitutionally vague or overbroad . . . .”).
74. The Tobe ordinance was not the city of Santa Ana’s first attempt to remove
homeless people from the city. See id. at 1151. The plaintiffs in Tobe argued “that the
ordinance was the culmination of a four-year effort by Santa Ana to expel homeless
persons.” Id. A 1988 policy of removing homeless people from certain locations,
disposing of sleeping bags and other belongings, and confiscating shopping carts
resulted in a lawsuit that the city settled in 1990. See id. In a memorandum, a Santa
Ana city official wrote “[t]he City Council has developed a policy that the vagrants
are no longer welcome in the City of Santa Ana.” Id. at 1177 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
For an in-depth discussion of the city’s actions that led to the Tobe case, see Harry
Simon, The Criminalization of Homelessness in Santa Ana, California: A Case Study, 29
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 725, 725-28 (1996).
75. Santa Ana Municipal Code § 10-402 on Unlawful Camping states: “It shall be
unlawful for any person to camp, occupy camp facilities or use camp paraphernalia
in the following areas, except as otherwise provided: (a) any street; (b) any public
parking lot or public areas, improved or unimproved.” SANTA ANA, CAL., CODE § 10402 (1992), reprinted in Tobe, 892 P.2d 1150. Section 10-403 on Storage of Personal
Property in Public Places states: “It shall be unlawful for any person to store personal
property, including camp facilities and camp paraphernalia, in the following areas,
except as otherwise provided by resolution of the City Council: (a) any park; (b) any
street; (c) any public parking lot or public area, improved or unimproved.” SANTA
ANA, CAL., CODE § 10-403 (1992), reprinted in Tobe, 392 P.2d at 1150-51. The
ordinance defines camp, camp facilities, and camp paraphernalia under § 10-401 as,
(a) Camp means to pitch or occupy camp facilities; to use camp
paraphernalia;
(b) Camp facilities include, but are not limited to, tents, huts, or temporary
shelters;
(c) Camp paraphernalia includes, but is not limited to, tarpaulins, cots, beds,
sleeping bags, hammocks or non-city designated cooking facilities and
similar equipment.
SANTA ANA, CAL., CODE § 10-401(a)-(c) (1992), reprinted in Tobe, 392 P.2d at 1151 n.2.
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homeless people for their status; and was vague and overbroad. The
77
court rejected all of plaintiff’s claims. The court distinguished the
case from Robinson and concluded that the Santa Ana municipal
78
ordinance was punishing conduct, not status.
The Tobe court,
however, suggested that the defense of necessity might be available
79
for “persons whose violation of the ordinance is involuntary.” The
court seemingly provided this “exception” in response to an assertion
made at oral argument by the senior deputy district attorney that
“truly homeless” persons may be able to assert the defense of
80
necessity.
The court suggested that the statute should not be
enforced against “persons who have no alternative to ‘camping’ or
81
placing ‘camp paraphernalia’ on public property.” It is this window

76. See Tobe, 892 P.2d at 1150 (detailing the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims that
the ordinance restricted the right to travel, was vague, punished status, and was
overbroad).
77. See id. at 1166-69 (finding that the ordinance punished conduct, not status;
clearly specified the conduct it prohibited; and was a constitutional imposition of
police power).
78. See id. at 1167 (“Assuming arguendo that the accuracy of the declarants’
descriptions of the circumstances in which they were cited under the ordinance, it is
far from clear that none had alternatives to either the condition of being homeless
or the conduct that led to homelessness and to the citations.”).
79. Id. at 1155.
80. See id. at 1155 n.8 (stating that a senior deputy district attorney conceded that
a necessity defense might be available to persons who have no alternative to
“camping” on public property).
81. See id. (listing the senior deputy district attorney’s comments at oral
argument). Professor Fred Bosselman suggests that the Tobe court may have been
influenced by the Northern District of Texas’ decision in Johnson v. Dallas, 860 F.
Supp. 344 (N.D. Tex. 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995). See
Fred P. Bosselman, Camping By the Homeless as a Use of Land, 34 A.L.I.–A.B.A. 1119,
1123 (1995) (stating that an issue left unresolved in Tobe was the subject of the
Johnson case). In Johnson, the court found that the ordinance violated the Eighth
Amendment and that “at any given time there are persons in Dallas who have no
place to go, who could not find shelter even if they wanted to—and many of them do
want to—and who would be turned away from shelter for a variety of reasons.” See id.
(citing Johnson, 860 F. Supp. at 350).
The California Supreme Court’s use of the necessity defense to avoid
unconstitutional applications of this ordinance is similar to the same court’s creation
of a constitutional defense for chronic alcoholics to an ordinance that prohibited
public drunkenness. See Sundance v. Municipal Ct., 729 P.2d 80, 89 (Cal. 1986).
The court upheld a trial court’s ruling that the defense would be available:
[I]f he proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he is “(1) unable to
refrain from drinking alcohol to the point where he is unable to care for
himself and others, and (2) unable (a) by reason of the disease, or
(b) indigency, to refrain from being in public while intoxicated.”
Id. To the extent that homelessness becomes a chronic condition when a city, such
as Santa Ana, does not provide sufficient resources to assist homeless people in
moving into housing, the two defenses are analogous. Compare Tobe v. City of Santa
Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1155 (Cal. 1995) (suggesting that an involuntary violation of the
anti-camping ordinance may create a due-process-based necessity defense), with
Sundance, 729 P.2d at 89 (upholding a trial court’s criteria for a constitutional
defense that may be used by a chronic alcoholic).
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of relief that allows the use of the necessity defense for homeless
people. Building on this idea from Tobe, the In re Eichorn court
further addressed the necessity defense where police arrested a
82
homeless man under the same ordinance contested in Tobe.
III. THE NECESSITY DEFENSE
83

Although not codified in some jurisdictions, the necessity defense,
justification, or choice of evils doctrine can be traced to 19th Century
84
England. The defense promotes the notion that although the harm
caused should be avoided, the “harm is outweighed by the need to
avoid an even greater harm and to further a greater societal
85
interest.” Although the number and content of the elements to the
86
necessity defense differ among jurisdictions, California requires the

82. See In re Eichorn, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535, 539 (Ct. App. 1998) (noting that the
prosecution in Tobe assured the court that a necessity defense might be available and
that prosecutorial discretion would be used in cases involving “truly homeless”
persons).
83. “California appellate courts have recognized the necessity defense ‘despite
the absence of any statutory articulation of this defense and rulings from the
California Supreme Court that the common law is not part of the criminal law in
California.’” Id. at 538 (quoting People v. Garziano, 281 Cal. Rptr. 307, 308 (Ct. App.
1991)).
84. See, e.g., The Queen v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 288 (1884)
(finding that the necessity defense was not available to an incident of cannibalism
upon a ship lost at sea where there was no threat to life except imminent starvation).
85. 1 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 24(a) (1984).
86. See ALA. CODE § 13A-3-21(a) (1994 & Supp. 1999) (“Except as otherwise
expressly provided, justification or excuse under this article is a defense.”); ALASKA
STAT. § 11.81.320(a) (Michie 1998 & Supp. 1999) (“Conduct which would otherwise
be an offense is justified by reason of necessity to the extent permitted by common
law . . . .”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-604(a) (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1999) (“Conduct
which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable when: (1) The conduct is
necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury;
and (2) The desirability and urgency of avoiding the injury outweigh, according to
ordinary standards of reasonableness, the injury sought to be prevented by the law
proscribing the conduct.”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-702(1) (2000) (“[C]onduct
which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal when it is
necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury
which is about to occur by reason of a situation occasioned or developed through no
conduct of the actor, and which is of sufficient gravity that, according to ordinary
standards of intelligence and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding the
injury clearly outweigh a desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by
the statute defining the offense in issue.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-16 (West
1994 & Supp. 2000) (“In any prosecution for an offense, justification . . . shall be a
defense.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 463 (1999) (“[C]onduct which would otherwise
constitute an offense is justifiable when it is necessary as an emergency measure to
avoid an imminent public or private injury which is about to occur by reason of a
situation occasioned or developed through no fault of the defendant, and which is
of such gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality, the
desirability and urgency of avoiding such injury clearly outweigh the desirability of
avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense in
issue. The necessity and justifiability of such conduct may not rest upon
considerations pertaining only to the morality and advisability of the statute, either in
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its general application or with respect to its application to a particular class of cases
arising thereunder.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (1999 & Supp. 2000) (“The fact that a
person’s conduct is justified is a defense to prosecution for any crime based on that
conduct. The defense of justification can be claimed: . . . (6) In all other instances
which stand upon the same footing of reason and justice as those enumerated in this
article.”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-302(1) (1999) (“Conduct which the actor believes to
be necessary to avoid an imminent harm or evil to the actor or to another is
justifiable provided that: (a) The harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct
is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged
. . . .”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-13 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000) (“Conduct which
would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of necessity if the accused was
without blame in occasioning or developing the situation and reasonably believed
such conduct was necessary to avoid a public or private injury greater than the injury
which might reasonably result from his own conduct.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 503.030(1) (Banks-Baldwin 1995) (“[C]onduct which would otherwise constitute
an offense is justifiable when the defendant believes it to be necessary to avoid an
imminent public or private injury greater than the injury which is sought to be
prevented by the statute defining the offense charged . . . .”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, § 103(1) (West 1983 & Supp. 1999) (“Conduct which the actor believes to be
necessary to avoid imminent physical harm to himself or another is justifiable if the
desirability and urgency of avoiding such harm outweigh, according to ordinary
standards of reasonableness, the harm sought to be prevented by the statute defining
the crime charged. The desireability and urgency of such conduct may not rest upon
considerations pertaining to the morality and advisability of such statute.”); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 563.026 (West 1999) (“Unless inconsistent with other provisions of this
chapter defining justifiable use of physical force, or with some other provision of law,
conduct which would otherwise constitute any crime other than a class A felony or
murder is justifiable and not criminal when it is necessary as an emergency measure
to avoid an imminent public or private injury which is about to occur by reason of a
situation occasioned or developed through no fault of the actor, and which is of such
gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality, the
desirability of avoiding the injury outweighs the desirability of avoiding the injury
sought to be prevented by the statute defining the crime charged.”); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 627:3 (1996 & Supp. 1999) (“Conduct which the actor believes to be
necessary to avoid harm to himself or another is justifiable if the desirability and
urgency of avoiding such harm outweigh, according to ordinary standards of
reasonableness, the harm sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense
charged. The desirability and urgency of such conduct may not rest upon
considerations pertaining to the morality and advisability of such statute, either in its
general or particular application.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-2(a) (West 1995 & Supp.
2000) (“Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of
necessity to the extent permitted by law and as to which neither the code nor other
statutory law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the
specific situation involved and a legislative purpose to exclude the justification
claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (McKinney
1997) (“Unless otherwise limited by the ensuing provisions of this article defining
justifiable use of physical force, conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense
is justifiable and not criminal when . . . [s]uch conduct is necessary as an emergency
measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury which is about to occur by
reason of a situation occasioned or developed through no fault of the actor, and
which is of such gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence and
morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding such injury clearly outweigh the
desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the statute defining the
offense in issue. The necessity and justifiability of such conduct may not rest upon
considerations pertaining only to the morality and advisability of the statute, either in
its general application or with respect to its application to a particular class of cases
arising thereunder. Whenever evidence relating to the defense of justification under
this subdivision is offered by the defendant, the court shall rule as a matter of law
whether the claimed facts and circumstances would, if established, constitute a
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defendant to meet six elements: (1) the defendant must have acted
to prevent a significant evil; (2) there were no adequate alternatives
to performing the act; (3) the harm caused by the act was not
disproportionate to the harm avoided; (4) the defendant had a good
faith belief that the act was necessary; (5) the defendant’s “objective
belief was reasonable under all the circumstances; and (6) he did not
87
substantially contribute to creating the emergency.” The defense is
codified in the Model Penal Code, which does not discuss specific

defense.”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-01 (1997) (“Except as otherwise expressly
provided, justification or excuse under this chapter is a defense.”); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 161.200 (1999) (“Unless inconsistent with other . . . defining justifiable use of
physical force, or with some other provision of law, conduct which would otherwise
constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal when: (a) That conduct is
necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury;
and (b) The threatened injury is of such gravity that, according to ordinary standards
of intelligence and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding the injury
clearly outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the
statute defining the offense in issue. (2) The necessity and justifiability of conduct
under subsection (1) of this section shall not rest upon considerations pertaining
only to the morality and advisability of the statute, either in its general application or
with respect to its application to a particular class of cases arising thereunder.”);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 503(a) (1998) (“Conduct which the actor believes to be
necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable if: (1) the
harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be
prevented by the law defining the offense charged . . . .”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11609 (1999) (“[C]onduct is justified if: (1) The person reasonably believes the
conduct is immediately necessary to avoid imminent harm; and (2) The desirability
and urgency of avoiding the harm clearly outweigh, according to ordinary standards
of reasonableness, the harm sought to be prevented by the law proscribing the
conduct.”); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.22 (West 1994) (“Conduct is justified if:
(1) the actor reasonably believes the conduct is imminently necessary to avoid
imminent harm; (2) the desirability and urgency of avoiding the harm clearly
outweigh, according to ordinary standards of reasonableness, the harm sought to be
prevented by the law proscribing the conduct; and (3) a legislative purpose to
exclude the justification claimed for the conduct does not otherwise plainly
appear.”); WIS. STAT. § 939.47 (1996) (“Pressure of natural physical forces which
causes the actor reasonably to believe that his or her act is the only means of
preventing imminent public disaster, or imminent death or great bodily harm to the
actor or another and which causes him or her so to act, is a defense to a prosecution
for any crime based on that act, except that if the prosecution is for first-degree
intentional homicide, the degree of the crime is reduced to 2nd-degree intentional
homicide.”); see also SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 4, § 5.4(d), at 634
(finding that the six general elements of the necessity defense are: (1) a harm
avoided, which may be harm to the defendant or to others; (2) a harm done; (3) an
intention to avoid harm; (4) the resulting harm must be less than the harm avoided;
(5) pending disaster must be immediate; and (6) the defendant must not be
responsible for creating the danger); see also Burns, supra note 6, at 806 (citing
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 5.4(d) (1986) (stating that
there are five elements to the necessity defense)); Laura J. Schulkind, Note, Applying
the Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience Cases, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 79, 82 (1989)
(suggesting that almost all common law requirements for the necessity defense
contain the same 3 elements: “(1) the actor has acted to avoid a significant evil;
(2) there are no adequate legal means to escape the harm; and (3) the remedy is not
disproportionate to the evil sought to be avoided”).
87. People v. Slack, 258 Cal. Rptr. 702, 704 (Ct. App. 1989).
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88

elements of the defense.
Historically, the defense of necessity was distinguishable from that
89
90
of duress, but this distinction no longer exists in modern case law.
The pre-eminent federal authority on the use of the necessity defense
91
is United States v. Bailey, where the Supreme Court analyzed the use
92
of the necessity defense in a prison escape case.
The Court
recognized that whether under the defense of necessity or duress, if a
reasonable legal alternative exists such that the defendant could have
93
avoided violating the law, both defenses will fail.

88. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1962). The rule, titled “Justification
Generally: Choice of Evils,” states:
1) Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to
himself or to another is justifiable, provided that:
a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that
sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and
b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions
or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and
c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not
otherwise plainly appear.
2) When the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation
requiring a choice of harms or evils or in appraising the necessity for his
conduct, the justification afforded by this Section is unavailable in a
prosecution for any offense for which recklessness or negligence, as the case
may be, suffices to establish culpability.
Id. (emphasis added).
89. The defense of duress is defined as:
A person’s unlawful threat (1) which causes the defendant reasonably to
belief that the only way to avoid imminent death or serious bodily injury to
himself or to another is to engage in conduct which violates the literal terms
of the criminal law, and (2) which causes the defendant to engage in that
conduct, gives the defendant the defense of duress . . . to the crime in
question unless that crime consists of intentionally killing an innocent third
person.
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 4, § 5.3, at 614. The Model Penal Code § 2.09
defines duress as:
An affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to
constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a
threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another,
that a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable
to resist.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (1962).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980) (maintaining that
modern cases tend to blur the distinction between the defenses of duress and
necessity such that courts may decide to disregard the distinctions and instead
examine the underlying policies of the defenses).
91. 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
92. See id. at 409-14 (analyzing the elements for the defenses of duress and
necessity in regard to the evidence of the respondent’s jail conditions and the
respondent’s reasons for not returning to custody after escaping the allegedly
coercive conditions).
93. See id. at 410, 410-11 n.8 (maintaining that courts have consistently denied
the defenses of duress and necessity when there exists a reasonable alternative to
breaking the law, such as refusing to do the criminal act or avoiding the harm); see,
e.g., R.I. Recreation Ctr., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir.
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When raising the defense of necessity in the context of
homelessness, attorneys may be concerned with whether to
94
characterize a homeless client’s situation as “involuntary.”
Voluntariness is, of course, a relative term. A homeless person may
have made some type of choice months or years prior to living on the
street that in some way resulted in a loss of housing. It is, however,
hard to say that living on the street is “voluntary” because of its
95
relationship to a previous choice. Although some commentators
suggest that volition is an unnecessary element in determining the
96
constitutional application of anti-homeless ordinances, the concept
97
continues to appear in case law.

1949) (denying the defense of duress where a man committed a crime under a death
threat to his relative because he had the opportunity to contact the police, but did
not).
94. See Wes Daniels, “Derelicts,” Recurring Misfortune, Economic Hard Times and
Lifestyle Choices: Judicial Images of Homeless Litigants and Implications for Legal Advocates,
45 BUFF. L. REV. 687, 708-15 (1997) (explaining that although lawyers won some
important cases by portraying their homeless clients as “unfortunate victims of forces
beyond their control,” this approach may cause significant risks of defeat, especially
when judges believe that homelessness is a lifestyle choice).
95. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Memorandum of Points and
Authorities at 28, 31; In re Eichorn, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535 (Ct. App. 1998) (No.
G022777) [hereinafter Petition for Writ] (arguing that the trial court was in error in
finding that defendant’s homelessness “was the result of personal choice” because
the defendant had been homeless since 1982). “It may be that for many,
homelessness is at some level ‘voluntary.’ But the range of choices available to
homeless individuals may be so narrow and so unsatisfying that a condition many of
us cannot imagine being freely chosen is indeed the least of all possible evils.”
Daniels, supra note 94, at 716.
An illustration of choices that could confuse the issue of voluntariness is found in
the story of a woman and her boyfriend who have lived in a van in San Francisco for
approximately two years. See Evelyn Nieves, Living in a Balky Van, Trying to Move
Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1999, at NE25. The couple became homeless when the
boyfriend’s relatives evicted them to sell the property. See id. At the time, the woman
was enrolled in travel school and her boyfriend had just quit his job. See id. Because
of her debt, the woman moved into her van because she could not afford housing
and invited her boyfriend to join her. See id. She dropped out of school and now
works two jobs, while her boyfriend receives income through a city program that
helps steer unemployed persons into jobs. See id. Their funds are used to pay
outstanding debt and to buy bare necessities. See id. Because living in a vehicle is
illegal in San Francisco, police have called the couple habitual offenders. See id. The
couple’s alternatives are limited, however, given that the number of homeless people
in San Francisco has been estimated at 11,000 to 16,000 persons and there are
generally only 1,359 emergency shelter spaces with 250-280 additional spaces in the
winter. See OUT OF SIGHT, supra note 26, at 4.
The point at which one choice can be said to have caused the couple’s current
situation is unclear. Excessive debt that accrued over time is too gradual to
constitute a choice. Although the couple chose to live in the van, the story suggests
that the lack of shelter space may have made that choice their only adequate option.
96. See Tier, supra note 13, at 267 (maintaining that states and cities do not need
to limit their criminal laws to voluntary conduct, but rather, states and cities may
include involuntary acts as causes for convictions).
97. See Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1155 (Cal. 1995) (arguing that
an involuntary violation of an ordinance may result in a due-process-based necessity
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Voluntariness is inherent to the necessity defense. To raise the
defense, a defendant must have chosen between two acts and, in
99
doing so, must have chosen the “lesser evil.” The Tobe court’s use of
the term involuntary indicates that the necessity defense would be
available only to persons whose “violation of the ordinance is
100
involuntary.” This statement sets up an interesting contradiction in
which a defendant who “voluntarily” chooses the lesser of two harms
101
renders his or her decision involuntary. In addition, the Tobe court
emphasized that a trial court first must determine that a person is
“involuntarily homeless” before deciding whether the defendant
102
“involuntarily” violated the ordinance.
103
Professor John Parry asserts that the theory of voluntarism “is an
104
and that
inadequate explanation of criminal responsibility”
determining whether the defendant acted with volition requires the
105
fact finder to evaluate the defendant’s conduct.
Professor Parry
argues that this evaluation is paramount to consequentialism, or the

defense).
98. See Schulkind, supra note 86, at 85 (maintaining that the purpose of the
necessity defense is to promote results that are socially desirable, and as a result this
defense evaluates the quality and wisdom of a defendant’s voluntary choices);
Lawrence P. Tiffany & Carl A. Anderson, Legislating the Necessity Defense in Criminal
Law, 52 DENV. U. L. REV. 839, 841 (1975) (“The necessity defense always involves a
voluntary choice on the part of the actor.”).
99. See Robinson, supra note 85, at 83 (suggesting that burning a field to fire
block a raging forest fire would satisfy all the elements of arson, but the fire starter
would likely have a complete defense if his actions saved 10,000 lives, as his action is
the “lesser evil”).
100. See Tobe, 892 P.2d at 1155 (holding that a due-process-based necessity defense
may occur when violation of the ordinance is involuntary); id. at 1155-56 n.8 (“A
senior deputy district attorney expressed his opinion at oral argument before this
court that a necessity defense might be available to ‘truly homeless’ persons and said
that prosecutorial discretion would be exercised.”).
101. Such a distinction is not without foundation, as the following passage
indicates:
[T]he word “necessity” is only used by the defence [sic] to a charge of crime
in what is the vain hope of making the criminal deed appear to have been
the result either of involuntary conduct, or of some irresistible external
compulsion, instead of what it really was, the result of a voluntary choice of
that alternative which the accused felt to be the less disagreeable to himself.
1 SIR WILLIAM OLDNALL RUSSELL, RUSSELL ON CRIME 93 (J.W. Cecil Turner ed., 12th
ed. 1964), formerly titled A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS (1819), cited in
Tiffany & Anderson, supra note 98, at 841 n.2.
102. See Tobe, 892 P.2d at 1157 (determining that, because none of the petitioners
in the second action addressed in Tobe alleged that they were involuntarily homeless
and that their violation of the ordinance was involuntary, the claim would not
succeed).
103. John T. Parry, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
104. See Parry, supra note 9, at 421.
105. See id. at 422 (explaining that the fact finder should weigh the defendant’s
conduct in comparison to the alternatives to determine whether the defendant’s
conduct was justified).
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106

balancing of social harms, and thus voluntarism becomes less
107
The balancing of harms is, however, an imperfect test
significant.
because there is no guide as to what harms should be balanced or
108
how to balance them. Where a conflict in values exists, the weight
109
given to each harm is unclear.
Nevertheless, the theoretical move to consequentialism is crucial
110
for attorneys representing homeless people. Professor Wes Daniels
argues that advocates must escape the realm of proving that their
111
clients are involuntarily homeless. He notes that cases have been
lost because “judges are convinced that homelessness is a ‘lifestyle
112
Although the balancing of harms test is somewhat
choice.’”
ambiguous, it allows the defense attorney to present alternatives to
113
the violation.
The alternatives, or harms avoided, might include
114
sleep deprivation or the risk of personal harm in going from shelter

106. The Model Penal Code requires a balancing of social harms. See id. at 415
(stating that the Model Penal Code requires weighing and balancing “to determine
whether the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that
sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged”); Frank Menetrez,
Consequentialism, Promissory Obligation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 47 UCLA L.
REV. 859, 863 (2000) (“Consequentialism is not easy to define concisely, but its
central tenet is that acting morally is simply a matter of acting so as to maximize the
production of a certain kind of outcome or consequence. The idea is that some
states or affairs are objectively better than others, and that one morally ought always
to act so as to bring about the best possible state of affairs.”); see also supra note 88
(delineating the justifications for choicing between evils, as stated in § 3.02 of the
Model Penal Code).
107. See Parry, supra note 9, at 422 (explaining that voluntarism engages in the
same act of interpretative construction as does consequentialism and thus, once
someone must make normative evaluations of the good or reasonable, voluntarism is
left behind).
108. See id. at 415 (arguing, for example, that the Model Penal Code ignores that
selecting “what harms to weigh, and how to weigh them,” is essential to the defense
of necessity).
109. See id. at 417 (suggesting, for example, in a case of assisted suicide, that the
competing values of the decedent’s choice and protecting terminally ill people or
refusing to allow a human to determine whether another lives or dies, attempts to
reconcile values that may appear to be irreconcilable).
110. Wes Daniels, Professor, University of Miami School of Law.
111. See Daniels, supra note 94, at 715 (claiming that recent cases were lost because
judges believe homelessness is a lifestyle choice); see also Joyce v. City of San
Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 856-58 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (explaining that previous courts
have declined to conclude that homeless people have no realistic choice but to live
in public places).
112. Daniels, supra note 94, at 715.
113. See In re Eichorn, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535, 539 (Ct. App. 1998) (noting that the
defense of necessity can be applied in situations where “the harm or evil sought to be
avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law
defining the offense charged”).
114. See id. (asserting that sleep deprivation is an inadequate alternative to
sleeping in public because sleep deprivation can result in a host of physical and
mental problems, such as mood irritability, energy drain and low motivation, slow
reaction time, and the inability to concentrate and process information).
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115

to shelter in search of a bed. These harms can be used to prove the
116
elements of the necessity defense.
117
At trial, evaluation of the necessity defense is a jury question.
Although proffered testimony supporting each of the elements of the
118
necessity defense only need meet a minimum standard, many
courts do not allow the defense to reach the jury where the court
finds that the defendant has failed to meet one or more of the
119
elements.
The tension between a judge’s role in determining
whether the necessity defense should be allowed and the jury’s role in
determining the applicability of the defense was the foundation for
120
the appeal in In re Eichorn.

115. See Return to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Memorandum of Points
and Authorities at 16-17, In re Eichorn, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535 (Ct. App. 1998) (No.
G022777) [hereinafter Return to the Petition for Writ] (discussing, for example, the
testimony of James Wendel Meeker, Ph.D., who stated that there was gang presence
between the Armory, one of the City’s shelters, and the Civic Center where the
defendant was arrested).
116. See People v. Pepper, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 877 (Ct. App. 1996); People v. Pena,
197 Cal. Rptr. 264 (Ct. App. 1983), cited in Eichorn, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 539 (requiring
the defense of necessity to contain evidence that the “defendant violated the law
(1) to prevent a significant evil, (2) with no adequate alternative, (3) without
creating a greater danger than the one avoided, (4) with a good faith belief in the
necessity, (5) with such belief being objectively reasonable, and (6) under
circumstances in which he did not substantially contribute to the emergency”).
117. See 75A AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 833 (1991) (submitting that “[t]he danger and
necessity under which the accused acted are for the jury to determine”); see also
People v. Lovercamp, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110, 116 (1974) (“Whether any of the conditions
requisite to this defense exist is a question of fact to be decided by the trier of fact
after taking into consideration all the surrounding circumstances.”).
118. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 415 (1980) (stating that the
minimum standard is such that “if a jury finds it to be true, it would support an
affirmative defense”); cf. Schulkind, supra note 86, at 86 (discussing the difficulty in
determining how much evidence is needed to support the low burden of meeting
the elements of the necessity defense).
119. See United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 430 (9th Cir. 1985) (explaining
that when the evidence does not establish all the elements of the defense, a judge
does not have to submit the defense to the jury and may exclude the evidence
offered in support of the defense). A court’s failure to allow the necessity defense,
where a defendant met all the elements of the defense, may constitute a violation of
the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment
states that
[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
120. See In re Eichorn, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535, 536, 538 (Ct. App. 1998) (noting that
the petitioner appealed his conviction on several grounds including the trial judge’s
rejection of his offer of proof on the first element of the necessity defense).
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IV. IN RE EICHORN AND APPLICATION OF THE NECESSITY DEFENSE
James Eichorn was convicted of a misdemeanor violation of the
121
Santa Ana Municipal Code Article VIII, § 10-402, which bans
122
Mr. Eichorn was one of fifteen homeless
“Unlawful Camping.”
people police cited on January 25, 1994, for sleeping in the Santa Ana
123
Civic Center. All of the homeless individuals cited demurred to the
124
complaints against them except for Mr. Eichorn. Through various
appeals, the same group of homeless individuals became the plaintiffs
125
126
in Tobe and the City of Santa Ana stayed their prosecution.
In
1995, the city reinstituted these cases, but the cases were dismissed on
grounds of lack of speedy trial or other arrangements because the city
127
failed to enter a formal stay. Mr. Eichorn’s case was the only one of
128
15 cases to go to trial.
The trial court ruled that Mr. Eichorn could not utilize the
necessity defense because he failed to prove that he avoided a
129
“significant, imminent evil,” the first element of the necessity
defense, by sleeping in the Santa Ana Civic Center on January 25,
130
1993.
The court found that Mr. Eichorn was “not involuntarily
131
homeless on the night in question” because he chose not to go to

121. See SANTA ANA, CAL., CODE § 10-402 (1992) (pertaining to unlawful camping).
122. In re Eichorn, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 536 n.1.
123. See Petition for Writ, supra note 95, at 32, Eichorn (No. G022777) (detailing
the history of the case).
124. See id.
125. See id. (explaining that the homeless defendants police cited with Mr.
Eichorn filed a petition for writ of mandate to determine the constitutionality of the
Unlawful Camping Ordinance in Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145 (Cal.
1995)).
126. See id. at 5 n.10.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 5 (explaining that due to the dismissal of the other defendants’
cases, the City of Santa Ana only brought Mr. Eichorn’s to trial for unlawful
camping).
129. In re Eichorn, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535, 536 (Ct. App. 1998). In attempting to
prove avoidance of a “significant, imminent evil,” the defendant requested funds for
an expert witness to testify on the adverse effects of sleep deprivation. In denying the
request the judge held:
I’m inclined to deny the request for the physician because I think that the
area the physician will testify to as you proposed in the motion is something
that jurors are well aware of. I mean, it doesn’t take an expert to tell us that,
to convince a person, that there are ill effects that arise from sleep
deprivation. I don’t need the doctor to tell me that the defendant had to
sleep somewhere.
Petition for Writ, supra note 95, at 35, Eichorn (No. G022777) (citing Petitioner’s
Appendix 217).
130. See Eichorn, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 536-37 (explaining that the offer of proof did
not support the necessity defense because the first element of this defense was not
satisfied by the claim of harm caused by sleep deprivation).
131. Id. at 538.
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132

the city’s shelter. The court also found that the defendant should
have attempted to obtain housing from relatives and applied for
133
public benefits.
The Court of Appeal for the Fourth District of California rejected
the trial court’s determination that the defendant did not avoid a
significant evil by sleeping at the Civic Center, and as a result, found
that the defendant should have been allowed to assert the necessity
134
defense at trial. Although the court delineated six elements to the
135
necessity defense, the court focused only briefly on the first element
136
The court found that by
in response to the trial court’s ruling.
sleeping in the civic center, the defendant may have been avoiding
137
the “significant evil” of sleep deprivation.
The importance of the opinion, however, derives from the court’s
recognition of housing barriers faced by Eichorn and other homeless
138
persons due to a lack of resources in Santa Ana, and how such
barriers permitted the invocation of a necessity defense for violation
of the ordinance. The court examined the trial testimony presented
by several advocates for homeless people and local agency officials,
each of whom explained what few resources Eichorn had available
139
The testimony
both prior to and on the night he was cited.

132. See id. (noting Mr. Eichorn’s failure to see if there was room at the Armory, a
homeless shelter open on cold winter nights).
133. See id. at 538 (noting the trial court’s belief that Mr. Eichorn should have
sought assistance from his family and he should have applied for general relief (e.g.,
through the food stamp or work program), as these options were available and may
have helped to get him off the streets).
134. See id. at 538-40 (explaining that reasonable minds would differ on whether
Mr. Eichorn acted to prevent a significant evil; and, therefore, the issue of the
necessity defense should have been heard by a jury).
135. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (listing the elements of the necessity
defense). The court notes that the defense of necessity is not statutory in California,
but that courts continue to apply the defense regardless of “rulings from the
California Supreme Court that the common law is not a part of the criminal law in
California.” Eichorn, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 538 (quoting People v. Garziano, 281 Cal.
Rptr. 307, 308 (Ct. App. 1991)).
136. See id. at 536 n.2 (explaining the trial court’s decisions and suggesting that
the trial court’s questions and comments such as “what do you mean ‘bodily harm?’
Like tired eyelids or blood?; [I]f he didn’t sleep here, he’d lose sleep and this would
be a horrible physical thing to impose on him?” show that the trial court did not
understand the seriousness of the defendant’s situation).
137. See id. at 539 (explaining that definitions of what prevents “significant evil”
differ, but that “[s]leep is a physiological need, not an option for humans . . .
[because] loss of sleep produces a host of physical and mental problems.”).
138. See id. at 540 n.4 (noting that the city’s “economic forces were primarily to
blame for [Eichorn’s] predicament,” which could not be resolved by requiring him
to sleep in nearby churches, covered stairwells, buildings or other private and public
property).
139. See id. at 537-38 (listing the specific names and testimony of these witnesses);
infra notes 141-148 and accompanying text (describing the substance of testimony by
these witnesses relating to the lack resources available to Eichorn on the night of his
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addresses two of the factors that directly cause homelessness—lack of
140
housing (including the lack of shelter) and income.
A. Housing, Shelter, and Income
At trial, various witnesses addressed homelessness in Santa Ana and
Orange County and discussed the limited resources available to
homeless individuals. First, Professor James Meeker from the
University of California at Irvine, in citing his 1993 study on
homelessness, stated that for the 3,000 homeless people in Orange
County during January and February, the supply of affordable
141
housing had continually decreased.
Moreover, he explained that
most of the homeless individuals in the county could not secure
accommodations because they had “lost jobs and could not afford
142
housing.”
Second, Timothy Shaw, Executive Director of the
Orange County Homeless Issues Task Force, testified that, in 1993,
1,500 homeless people lived within Santa Ana, yet the county only
supplied 118 shelter beds year-round and an additional 125 beds
143
when the armory opened during the winter.
Finally, Maria
Mendoza, the county’s homeless coordinator, explained that on the
144
night of Eichorn’s arrest, the armory was full beyond its capacity.
She further testified that Eichorn had spent twenty nights at the
145
armory in December and January.
June Marcott, the program manager for the Orange County food
stamps and general relief program, testified about the monetary
146
resources available to Eichorn. She found that when Eichorn was
not employed, he could receive $307 per month as part of a work

arrest).
140. See BURT, supra note 12, at 162 (analyzing how a city’s homelessness rate is
immediately affected by housing, which includes vacancy rates and the ratio of
affordable units to low income individuals, and income variables, which includes the
poverty rate and income per capita).
141. See Eichorn, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 537; see also Petition for Writ, supra note 95, at
32 n.74, Eichorn (No. GO22777) (stating that “in 1993, over 200,000 County residents
in the very low income bracket were competing with one another for the 7,825 rental
units available at under $300 a month.”).
142. See Eichorn, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 537 (noting that the problem particularly
affected men as “they were less likely to receive the support of family, friends or
governmental agencies”).
143. See id. Moreover, Shaw noted that these shelters were routinely full, thereby
resulting in the lack of accommodations for over 1200 individuals. See id.
144. See id. (noting that the Armory exceed its capacity by thirteen individuals).
145. See id. at 537; see also Return to the Petition for Writ, supra note 115, at 18-19,
Eichorn (No. G022777) (stating that the Armory was closed from December 12 to 16
and January 27 and 28, and exceeded its capacity on eighteen of the twenty-nine days
it was open in January).
146. See Eichorn, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 538 (discussing aspects of a work program for
which Eichorn was eligible).
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program if he worked nine days a month and submitted four job
147
applications daily. Eichorn, however, last received general relief in
November 1990, but was terminated for failure to submit a job search
report and his subsequent applications in March and June, 1992 were
148
denied.
B. Application
In focusing its opinion on an element of the necessity defense, the
California court changed the focus of the analysis from volition, as
149
prescribed by Tobe, to consequentialism. The court found that
“[t]here was substantial if not uncontradicted evidence that
[Eichorn] slept in the civic center because his alternatives were
150
151
inadequate and economic forces were primarily to blame for his

147. See id. at 538 (describing the requirements of the work program).
148. See id. At trial, Ms. Marcott testified she could not determine why the
petitioner’s application for general relief was denied in June 1992. See Petition for
Writ, supra note 95, at 17 n.28, Eichorn (No. G022777). Because there was no
evidence that the petitioner received explanation of the reinstatement process,
petitioner argued that “[g]iven that the county’s own expert could not determine the
reasons for her office denying relief, Eichorn should hardly be penalized for failing
to navigate properly the intricacies of this highly-regulated government program.”
Id.
149. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (discussing the Tobe court’s
suggestion that the necessity defense could be used by homeless people who
involuntarily violated the ordinance).
150. The trial court found that Eichorn had adequate alternatives because he
could have slept in “other buildings, nearby churches,” “rear stairs, rear doors.”
Eichorn, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 540 n.4. The court also suggested that Eichorn travel to
another city. See id. (“Is [it] a reasonable alternative . . . walking a mile or so [to a
nearby city without a camping ordinance]? Stroll on a nice sunny day, find a cushy
spot in Tustin, in a city park and make his home there.”).
The Court of Appeals responded that “neither trespassing on private property nor
walking to a different city was an adequate alternative . . . an individual who has no
reasonable alternative to sleeping in a public place in Santa Ana need not travel in
search of streets and other public places where he can catch his 40 winks.” Id.
151. The acknowledgement of economic factors that led to Eichorn’s condition
does not indicate necessarily that courts will begin to recognize the defense of
economic necessity. In State v. Moe, the Supreme Court of Washington held that
“[e]conomic necessity has never been accepted as a defense to a criminal charge.”
24 P.2d 638, 640 (Wash. 1933) (refusing to adopt the defense to charges of larceny
and rioting). In Moe, the defendants, during a demonstration for a greater allowance
of flour, raided a local grocery store after the Red Cross commissary chairman
denied their request. See id. at 639. The court reasoned that “were [the economic
necessity defense] ever countenanced, it would leave to the individual the right to
take the law into his own hands.” See id. at 640. Although deciding to rest in a
private or public place in order to avoid sleep deprivation could be analogized to
stealing groceries from a store in an effort to avoid starvation, the Eichorn court does
not appear to be making new law in this area. Eichorn’s economic situation
constituted only one factor that led to his homelessness, and the court acknowledged
this fact in determining that the defense of necessity should be allowed. See Eichorn,
81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 540. The court did not state that it should be an element or basis
for a defense. See id. (lacking language that an economic factor must be present to
invoke the necessity defense).
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152

This statement by the court, the focus of which is
predicament.”
the adequacy of alternatives, involved a balancing of harms. The trial
court’s finding that Eichorn “was not involuntarily homeless on the
153
night in question,” is irrelevant to whether Eichorn could raise the
154
The court did not analyze why Eichorn was
necessity defense.
denied public assistance, why he was not working at the time he was
cited, or why he did not contact relatives or travel to another
155
location, each of which may have been used to determine whether
156
he was involuntarily homeless.
The court made clear that once
157
Eichorn proved the basic elements of the necessity defense, he
could evoke such defense without inquiry into the causes of his
158
homelessness. Thus, if a defendant shows that: (1) the shelter was
full, (2) there were more homeless people in the area than shelter
space, and (3) he or she did not have funds to afford housing or a
motel room, then any alternative to sleeping in public, such as staying
awake and moving around, will be inadequate to rebut application of

152. Eichorn, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 540.
153. Id. at 538.
154. The defense team argued that the causes of Eichorn’s homelessness were
irrelevant in considering whether he could invoke the necessity defense at trial. See
Petition for Writ, supra note 95, at 31, Eichorn (G022777) (asserting that in Robinson,
the question did not involve whether a drug addict voluntarily chose to become
addicted, but “whether the defendant’s present conduct is a proper object of the
criminal laws”). In addition, Eichorn contended that when he (i) had required food
stamps, (ii) was denied general assistance, (iii) had regularly sought employment,
and (iv) could not stay with relatives, the obligation imposed on him to find housing
became impossible to fulfill. See id. at 32-33 (arguing that these factors demonstrated
Eichorn had no reasonable alternative but to sleep in public).
155. Eichorn, a veteran of the Vietnam War, testified that after losing a job he
moved to Santa Ana and drove an ice cream truck. See Eichorn, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 537
(narrating how he had no place to live before he moved to Santa Ana). He lived in a
motel room while driving the truck, but lost his job. See id. He then worked in the
county’s casual labor office until that office closed. See id. He lived in the streets,
usually near the civic center where other homeless people slept, when he did not
have enough funds to stay in a motel. See id. (testifying that he lived in a motel only
when he had saved enough money, but most inexpensive motels had raised prices).
He could not recall whether he actually had attempted to sleep at a shelter the night
of January 25, 1993, or whether he had believed it was full. See id. at 538.
Nevertheless, he had been “turned away from the Armory in the past and had a
‘nervous walk’ back to the civic center.” Id. at 538. A “nervous walk” may refer to the
presence of gangs in the area between the Armory and the civic center. See Return to
the Petition for Writ, supra note 115, at 16-17, Eichorn (G022777) (discussing the
testimony of James Wendel Meeker, Ph.D.).
156. See Parry, supra note 9, at 421 (determining that punishment for voluntary
action will be imposed where a defendant “had the capacity and opportunity to
conform to the law”).
157. See People v. Slack, 258 Cal. Rptr. 702, 704 (Ct. App. 1989) (outlining the six
elements of the defense under California law).
158. See Eichorn, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 540 (“The court must instruct if the evidence
could result in a finding [that] defendant’s criminal act was justified by necessity.”).
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159

the defense. Less clear now is, if shelter space was available, but a
defendant feared traveling to the shelter or thought the shelter was
unsafe, whether the shelter space would be considered a viable
160
alternative?
Regardless, the court’s shift from volition to a
balancing of harms and alternatives analysis through the application
of the necessity defense provides a new opportunity for homeless
advocates to defend their clients.
C. Impact upon Other Cities
Proponents of the Santa Ana ordinance now face the possibility
that all persons cited under the ordinance will contest the violation
by invoking the necessity defense. In other cities, where courts have
upheld anti-camping and sleeping ordinances as constitutional, the
necessity defense will be available to homeless people under the
Tobe/In re Eichorn theory if the violator shows that more homeless
people than shelter spaces exist and there is a lack of adequate
161
income to pay for housing. According to a National Law Center on
Homelessness & Poverty survey of fifty cities, each city examined had
fewer shelter spaces than homeless people as well as inadequate
income opportunities to assist homeless people in acquiring
162
housing.
If other courts follow, and permit the necessity defense, legislatures
will be forced to reconsider anti-camping and sleeping ordinances for

159. See id. at 536 (finding that Eichorn, in presenting these facts, presented
sufficient evidence for a jury determination of whether his criminal violation was to
prevent a significant evil). The court does not require the defendant to prove that
he did not have friends or relatives in the area with whom he could not stay. See id. at
538. Although the defendant testified at trial that his mother and step-father lived in
a nearby area, he would not stay with them because “he was ‘an adult responsible for’
himself,” the Court of Appeal did not analyze this portion of Eichorn’s testimony and
did not mention the possibility that he had other relatives or friends in the area. See
id. at 538 (lacking such discussion).
160. See Daniels, supra note 94, at 716-17 n.168 (citing Pottinger v. City of Miami,
810 F. Supp. 1551, 1580 n.34 (S.D. Fl. 1992), for the proposition that shelter space
may not be a viable alternative when “the shelter is dangerous, drug infested, crimeridden or especially unsanitary” because a homeless person should not have to
choose between his health and possession, a place to sleep and possible arrest); see
also Eichorn, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 540 (discussing only that Eichorn acted to prevent a
significant evil). The court did not mention Eichorn’s fear of harm as a possible
prevention of locating a reasonable alternative place to sleep.
161. See Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1155 n.8 (Cal. 1995) (relying
upon a district attorney’s belief that while the ordinance will still be applied against
campers, the “truly homeless” will not be targeted due to prosecutorial discretion
and that homeless people will likely invoke the defense); see also Eichorn, 81 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 539 (citing Tobe as declining to decide how an anti-camping ordinance may be
unconstitutionally applied).
162. See OUT OF SIGHT, supra note 26, at i; see also supra note 49 (listing cities
surveyed).
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two main reasons. First, if a homeless defendant utilizes the necessity
defense and succeeds, the utility of the ordinance in deterring
163
164
homeless people from public areas or from the city in general,
165
will be undermined. The necessity defense defeats the goal of anticamping and sleeping ordinances—to eliminate the presence of
166
homeless people in public areas —by acknowledging that violating
the ordinance presents the only reasonable choice for homeless
people. A homeless person who asserts the necessity defense and is
acquitted of the charge, will only continue to violate the ordinance
167
until a reasonable alternative to sleeping outside materializes.
Therefore, the ordinance’s intended deterrent effect fails to exist
168
when a homeless defendant asserts the necessity defense. When an
ordinance ceases to have a deterrent value it constitutes bad public
169
Thus, legislators will need to consider alternatives to the
policy.

163. Some reports find that anti-camping and sleeping ordinances have little
deterrent effect regardless of the presence of the necessity defense. A recent article
in the New York Times, profiling a homeless man’s lawsuit against Mayor Guiliani for
police “crackdowns on the homeless,” states that “internal reports by the Department
of Homeless Services reflect that homeless people routed from one place showed up
somewhere else, or ebbed back to the old spot over time.” Nina Bernstein, Homeless
Man Presses Legal Battle Against Backdrop of New Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1999,
at B5; see also Jonathan P. Hicks, Hillary Clinton Attacks Arrests of the Homeless, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at A1 (reporting that the First Lady criticized Mayor Guiliani for
his campaign to arrest homeless people by stating “[l]ocking people up for a day will
not take a single person off the streets”).
164. See Foscarinis, supra note 50, at 22-25 (discussing the purposes of
criminalizing acts by homeless people including “to drive homeless residents out of
the city”).
165. See Sundance v. Municipal Ct., 729 P.2d 80, 94-95 (Cal. 1986) (finding that
when an ordinance has no rehabilitative or deterrent effect upon chronic alcoholics,
a constitutional attack under the Eighth Amendment may be available).
166. See Maria Foscarinis, Out of Sight-Out of Mind? The Continuing Trend Toward the
Criminalization of Homelessness, 6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 145, 147 n.6 (1999)
(emphasizing that many cities, in enacting camping prohibitions, have expanded the
definition of camping beyond traditional activities to encompass homeless sleepers).
In fact, “73% of the 49 cities [from which information was available, see supra text
accompanying note 49 (listing the cities)] currently have ordinances prohibiting or
restricting sleeping or camping.” Id. at 150. See also Tier, supra note 13, at 266
(describing how certain urban anti-camping ordinances prohibit erecting tents or
other structures, cooking or storing personal items in public parks).
167. See Bernstein, supra note 163, at B5 (citing a New York Department of
Homeless Services report that found when police or city officials move homeless
people from one area they often travel back to the original location over time).
168. Invocation of the necessity defense eliminates the deterrent effect of an anticamping ordinance if one assumes that full prosecution will be sought under the
ordinance instead of the ordinance being used for mere citation purposes. See
Smith, supra note 56, at 328 n.168 (claiming that the necessity defense may not
frequently be employed because most “arrests of homeless people under antisleeping laws usually fall short of final adjudication”).
169. See Foscarinis, supra note 50, at 59-60 (“Criminalizing homelessness is poor
public policy for several reasons . . . . Perhaps the most fundamental, criminalization
responses do not and cannot work. Like all human beings, homeless people must
eat, sleep and occupy space.”).
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170

ordinance.
Second, this cycle of continued violations leads to another
consideration:
the broader social purpose of eliminating
homelessness. The availability of the necessity defense originates
from a locality’s lack of shelter space, income, and affordable
171
housing. Proponents of quality of life programs that seek to
improve urban landscapes must understand that when cities lack
affordable housing, income, and shelter, anti-camping ordinances
will cease to have any effect on the number of homeless people in a
172
locality.
Only an increase in affordable housing, income, and
shelter, rather than enforcement of anti-camping or sleeping
173
ordinances, will reduce homelessness.
Arrests and citations pursuant to anti-camping and sleeping
ordinances, together with the use of the necessity defense, also serve
to hinder judicial efficiency. The dissent in Tobe predicted that the
requirement that a defendant prove, on a case-by-case basis, he or she
was “truly homeless . . . would needlessly subject large numbers of
homeless persons to the criminal justice system for wholly innocuous
174
conduct and overwhelm our already strained judicial resources.”

170. See OUT OF SIGHT, supra note 26, at 53-61 (describing programs used as
alternatives to anti-camping and sleeping ordinances in Portland, OR; Omaha, NE;
San Francisco, CA; Dallas, TX; Washington, DC; New York, NY; West Hollywood, CA;
Seattle, WA; Glendale, CA; and Miami, FL.).
171. See supra text accompanying note 160.
172. For example, Rob Tier argues that because judges and advocates misperceive
the lack of affordable housing to be the overarching cause of homelessness, their
efforts to ensure the “right to live on the street, sleep in the public place of one’s
choosing, beg in any place and in any manner one pleases, and to essentially be
exempt from standard of conduct that apply to all others” jeopardizes the quality of
life in urban areas. Tier, supra note 13, at 261 (asserting that such efforts harm
communities, deteriorate neighborhoods and force people to abandon urban
centers due to the more aggressive behavior of homeless people). This argument
ignores the other factors, such as lack of shelter space and income maintenance,
which also cause homelessness. Furthermore, it assumes that homeless people, when
subject to laws that restrict behavior, will become “good citizens . . . capable of
obeying these new laws.” Id. at 263 (arguing that addicts, rather than homeless
people, engage in aggressive, anti-social behavior).
173. Enforcement of these ordinances substantially decreases public support for
economic support for the homeless, thereby reducing the opportunity for homeless
people to receive increased funding for housing and shelters. One advocate notes
that “[t]hese regulations have a two-fold negative effect in that they both endanger
the ability of homeless people to survive and they reduce the incentive and the
opportunity for the public to respond to the needs of these people.” See Nancy
Wright, Not in Anyone’s Backyard: Ending the “Contest of Nonresponsibility” and
Implementing Long-Term Solutions to Homelessness, 2 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 163,
174 (1995) (describing how the diminution of economic funding for general
assistance support, emergency shelters and low-income housing closely relates to the
increasing use of anti-camping ordinances and panhandling statutes).
174. Tobe v. City of Santa Anna, 892 P.2d 1145, 1175 (Cal. 1995) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that the majority’s “case-by-case showing by each individual
who is convicted under the ordinance that he or she was ‘truly homeless’” defies the
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For example, if police cited or arrested each homeless person in
175
Washington, D.C. for a violation of an anti-camping or sleeping
ordinance and if those arrested were able to raise the necessity
defense at trial, each trial would lead to a fourteen to thirty-six
percent increase in the number of misdemeanor cases filed in D.C.
176
Superior Court. Thus, legislatures must reevaluate the ordinances
to relieve the judiciary of the potential case load burdens.
Finally, the legislature must consider the effect that a citation
under the ordinance has on a homeless person. The trial court
177
ordered Eichorn to perform forty hours of community service. Not
178
only does such punishment prevent him from working, but also it

notion of judicial efficiency); cf. Tier, supra note 13, at 268 (arguing that inquiry into
the housing and shelter availability compels an inappropriate judicial involvement
into “public housing and shelter spending in the jurisdiction”).
The notion that the ordinance will become insulated from meaningful review has
proven to be an accurate prediction. Eichorn argued in his petition that the
ordinance violated equal protection when it prevented him from engaging in lifesustaining acts. See Petition for Writ, supra note 95, at 37, Eichorn (No. G022777)
(stating that “[t]he Ordinance does not pass constitutional muster” because the right
to partake in life-sustaining activities is fundamental). He again argued the point lost
in Tobe, that the underlying purpose of the ordinance is to remove homeless people
from Santa Ana. See id. (“Despite the Ordinance’s facial neutrality, the Ordinance’s
true and principle purpose is to drive the homeless out of Santa Ana and to prevent
new homeless from entering the City.”); see also Tobe, 892 P.2d at 1159-60 (“We
cannot assume . . . that the sole purpose of the ordinance is simply to drive the
homeless out of Santa Ana.”).
The city, however, ignores these arguments in its Return to the Petition, as did the
court. See Traverse to the People’s Return; Memorandum of Points and Authorities
at 1, In re Eichorn, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535 (Ct. App. 1998) (No. G022777) (“The People
are . . . mysteriously quiet on the constitutional issue.”); see also In re Eichorn, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 535, 540 (Ct. App. 1998) (“[B]ecause Eichorn is entitled to raise a necessity
defense to charges he violated the camping ordinance, we find no other
constitutional violations under the circumstances of this case.”). In addition,
Eichorn argued that the Santa Ana ordinance was distinguishable from the law in
Powell, where Justice Black concurred in finding a statute punishing public
drunkenness constitutional because it was consistent with the notions of deterrence,
isolation, and treatment. See Petition for Writ, supra note 95, at 19, Eichorn (No.
G022777) (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 540-41 (1968)). In this case, Eichorn
could not be deterred because he had no choice but to sleep outside. He was not
isolated by the citation because authorities released him on his own recognizance.
Finally, he received 40 hours of community service, which seems misplaced given
that community service does not relieve the cause of his homelessness—namely lack
of housing, shelter, and income. See id. (justifying the punishment received by an
alcoholic for public drunkenness).
175. Statistics cited in Part I of this Note show that between 700 and 1,800
homeless people live on the street in Washington, D.C. See supra text accompanying
note 17.
176. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COURTS, 1998 ANNUAL REPORT 70 (1999) (reporting that authorities filed 4,985
misdemeanor cases under District of Columbia law in 1998).
177. See Eichorn, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 538.
178. See Petition for Writ, supra note 95, at 6, Eichorn (No. G022777) (“The
‘treatment’ that Eichorn received was 40 hours of community service, which
obviously interferes with his ability to work at a paying job and become not
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fails to deter or rehabilitate him from violating the ordinance again
because the punishment does not relieve the cause of the violation—
his homelessness. Legislators, in their attempt to sweep the streets of
homeless people, fail to realize the exacerbating effect these
ordinances have on the general causes of homelessness.
CONCLUSION
Ordinances that prohibit sleeping and camping in public are
imperfect responses to addressing the presence of homeless people
in public places. Prior to In re Eichorn, social service providers and
legislators primarily adopted and addressed the issue. Judicial
responsibility was limited to construction and constitutional
application of the ordinance. After Eichorn, courts will have to make
room for individual trials on the justification for each homeless
person’s violation of an ordinance. If courts begin hearing a large
number of cases that contest anti-camping citations using the
necessity defense, the utility of these ordinances will be limited.
Furthermore, the In re Eichorn court’s recognition of the lack of
shelter space and other resources that assist homeless and other lowincome people may create more support for social service programs
and assist other localities in opposing the use of the ordinances.
Localities must begin to consider alternatives to such ordinances
before burdening the judicial system.


homeless.”).

